The Ḥanafī View on a Woman Contracting Her Own Marriage Without a Guardian

Differences between the Sunni schools of law are rarely arbitrary. They usually arise from distinct legal methodologies applied to the Qurʾān, Sunnah, Companion practice, analogy, inherited juristic principles, and the hierarchy of evidence. One of the clearest examples is the question of whether a sane adult woman may validly contract her own marriage without her guardian, walī, directly conducting the contract.

The majority of jurists, especially the Shāfiʿīs and Ḥanbalīs, treat the guardian as a condition for the validity of the marriage contract. The Ḥanafī school, however, validates the marriage contract of a free, sane, adult woman when the normal conditions of marriage are fulfilled: offer and acceptance, witnesses, absence of legal impediments, and due regard for suitability, kafāʾah.

This Ḥanafī position is not a modern claim of unrestricted individual autonomy, nor is it a dismissal of the Sunnah. It rests on a coherent legal method: the adult woman possesses legal capacity, ahliyyah; the Qurʾān repeatedly attributes marriage agency to women; and a solitary report, khabar wāḥid, is not used in Ḥanafī uṣūl to add a new validity-condition to an unrestricted Qurʾānic ruling where doing so would amount to ziyādah ʿalā al-naṣṣ, an addition to the revealed text.

The Ḥanafī conclusion is therefore balanced: the sane adult woman’s legal capacity is affirmed, while the guardian’s protective interest remains operative through kafāʾah, appropriate dower, and the right of objection in cases of legally recognized harm.

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Preliminary Clarification

This article explains the classical Ḥanafī legal position on this issue as a means of illustrating the madhhab’s methodology. It is not a legal ruling by me, Abu Ihsan. It is not advice to bypass family consultation, civil registration, local law, or qualified fatwa. In actual cases, especially where marriage registration, civil rights, immigration, custody, or family disputes are involved, one should consult a qualified mufti and comply with the relevant legal procedures.

The expression “marriage without a guardian” is also imprecise. The Ḥanafī school does not regard the guardian as irrelevant. The precise question is whether the guardian is a condition of validity, sharṭ ṣiḥḥah, for the marriage contract of a free, sane, adult woman. The Ḥanafī answer is: no, not as a universal condition of validity, though the guardian may have a right of objection where suitability is absent.

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I. The Exact Ḥanafī Position

A concise Ḥanafī formulation appears in al-Lubāb fī Sharḥ al-Kitāb:

وَيَنْعَقِدُ نِكَاحُ الْمَرْأَةِ الْحُرَّةِ الْبَالِغَةِ الْعَاقِلَةِ بِرِضَاهَا وَإِنْ لَمْ يَعْقِدْ عَلَيْهَا وَلِيٌّ عِنْدَ أَبِي حَنِيفَةَ، بِكْرًا كَانَتْ أَوْ ثَيِّبًا. وَقَالَ أَبُو يُوسُفَ وَمُحَمَّدٌ: لَا يَنْعَقِدُ إِلَّا بِوَلِيٍّ.

The marriage of a free, adult, sane woman is concluded by her consent, even if no guardian contracts it on her behalf, according to Abū Ḥanīfah, whether she is a virgin or previously married. Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad said: it is not concluded except with a guardian.

The commentary immediately gives the standard reasoning:

لِتَصَرُّفِهَا فِي خَالِصِ حَقِّهَا وَهِيَ مِنْ أَهْلِهِ، وَلِهَذَا كَانَ لَهَا التَّصَرُّفُ فِي الْمَالِ.

Because she is disposing of something that is purely her own right, and she is legally competent for it; and for this same reason she may dispose of property.

The passage then adds an important qualification: the apparent narration does not differentiate between a suitable and an unsuitable husband, though the guardian retains a right of objection where the husband is unsuitable. It also reports a further narration from Abū Ḥanīfah and Abū Yūsuf that marriage to a non-suitable man is not valid, and notes that this became the chosen fatwa position in some later works.

Al-Kāsānī gives a more analytical formulation in Badāʾiʿ al-Ṣanāʾiʿ. He classifies the guardian’s authority over a free, sane, adult woman, according to Abū Ḥanīfah, Zufar, and Abū Yūsuf’s earlier position, as a guardianship of recommendation and propriety rather than compulsion:

وَأَمَّا وِلَايَةُ النَّدْبِ وَالِاسْتِحْبَابِ فَهِيَ الْوِلَايَةُ عَلَى الْحُرَّةِ الْبَالِغَةِ الْعَاقِلَةِ بِكْرًا كَانَتْ أَوْ ثَيِّبًا فِي قَوْلِ أَبِي حَنِيفَةَ وَزُفَرَ وَقَوْلِ أَبِي يُوسُفَ الْأَوَّلِ.

As for the guardianship of recommendation and preference, it is guardianship over a free, adult, sane woman, whether virgin or previously married, according to Abū Ḥanīfah, Zufar, and Abū Yūsuf’s first position.

He then states the practical result:

إِذَا زَوَّجَتْ نَفْسَهَا مِنْ رَجُلٍ أَوْ وَكَّلَتْ رَجُلًا بِالتَّزْوِيجِ فَتَزَوَّجَهَا أَوْ زَوَّجَهَا فُضُولِيٌّ فَأَجَازَتْ جَازَ فِي قَوْلِ أَبِي حَنِيفَةَ وَزُفَرَ وَأَبِي يُوسُفَ الْأَوَّلِ.

If she marries herself to a man, or appoints a man as her agent for marriage who then concludes it, or an unauthorized person contracts her marriage and she approves it, it is valid according to Abū Ḥanīfah, Zufar, and Abū Yūsuf’s first position.

This is the core Ḥanafī position, but it must be stated with its qualification. If she marries a non-suitable man, the guardians have a right of objection. Al-Kāsānī says explicitly:

غَيْرَ أَنَّهَا إِذَا زَوَّجَتْ نَفْسَهَا مِنْ غَيْرِ كُفْءٍ فَلِلْأَوْلِيَاءِ حَقُّ الِاعْتِرَاضِ.

However, if she marries herself to a non-suitable man, the guardians have the right of objection.

So the most precise summary is this. According to the relied-upon Ḥanafī position, a free, sane, adult woman may validly contract her own marriage. However, if she marries a non-suitable man, or, according to some later fatwa formulations, if the marriage violates the guardian’s legally protected interest, the guardian may object and seek judicial intervention. (Section VIII returns to this qualification in detail.)

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II. The Methodological Root: Qaṭʿī, Ẓannī, and Ziyādah ʿalā al-Naṣṣ

The Ḥanafī ruling cannot be understood without the uṣūl distinction between qaṭʿī and ẓannī evidence.

The Qurʾān is qaṭʿī al-thubūt, decisive in transmission. A solitary report, khabar wāḥid, is ordinarily ẓannī al-thubūt, probabilistic in transmission, even when it is authentic, authoritative, and binding in law.

In Ḥanafī uṣūl, an unrestricted Qurʾānic ruling cannot simply be given an additional validity-condition by a solitary report when that condition would change the legal effect of the Qurʾānic text. This is connected to the principle:

الزِّيَادَةُ عَلَى النَّصِّ نَسْخٌ

An addition to the text is a form of abrogation.

More precisely: adding a non-independent condition or component to a revealed ruling functions as a partial abrogation of the original legal sufficiency of that ruling. Since the Qurʾānic text is decisive and a solitary report is probabilistic, the Ḥanafīs do not allow such an addition to be established by khabar wāḥid alone, because that would amount to abrogating the decisive by means of the probabilistic, which the school does not permit.

This does not mean the Ḥanafīs reject solitary ḥadīths. They do not. Rather, they assign them their proper legal force. A khabar wāḥid can establish obligation, recommendation, prohibition, dislike, or an interpretation of the text. What it cannot do, on its own, is add a validity-condition to an unrestricted Qurʾānic ruling in a way that cancels the original legal effect of that text.

This principle is central to the marriage issue. If the Qurʾān attributes marriage agency to women, and if adult legal capacity is established, then making the guardian an absolute condition of validity would be precisely such an added condition. For the Ḥanafīs, that addition would require evidence strong enough to bear that legal weight. It is striking, as section V will show, that al-Jaṣṣāṣ deploys exactly this naskh reasoning when reading the marriage verses, which shows that the principle is not a later uṣūlī imposition but is operative in the early Ḥanafī tafsīr of the very texts in dispute.

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III. A Parallel: Recitation in Prayer

The classic Ḥanafī parallel is recitation in prayer.

Allah says:

فَاقْرَءُوا مَا تَيَسَّرَ مِنَ الْقُرْآنِ “So recite whatever is easy for you of the Qurʾān.” Qurʾān 73:20

The phrase مَا تَيَسَّرَ, “whatever is easy,” is general. On the basis of this verse, the Ḥanafīs hold that the farḍ element is the basic act of Qurʾānic recitation, not the specific recitation of Sūrat al-Fātiḥah.

The counter-text is the well-known ḥadīth:

لَا صَلَاةَ لِمَنْ لَمْ يَقْرَأْ بِفَاتِحَةِ الْكِتَابِ

There is no prayer for the one who does not recite the Opening of the Book.

The majority treat this as establishing al-Fātiḥah as a pillar. The Ḥanafīs, however, say the ḥadīth establishes the specific recitation of al-Fātiḥah as wājib, not farḍ: to raise it to a pillar would add a condition to the absolute Qurʾānic command, which a solitary report cannot do. The farḍ therefore remains the basic recitation established by the Qurʾān, while the Fātiḥah is wājib by the ḥadīth.

The parallel to marriage is at the level of the legal engine, not identical in outcome. In the prayer case, the ḥadīth still generates a wājib ruling. In the marriage case, the guardian does not simply become “wājib” in the same technical way; rather, his interest re-enters through kafāʾah, propriety, and the right of objection where harm is present. What the two cases share is the underlying rule: a solitary report cannot impose a new validity-condition where the decisive text did not impose one.

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IV. Legal Capacity: Ahliyyah and the Adult Woman

The Ḥanafī argument begins with legal capacity, ahliyyah.

Allah says:

وَابْتَلُوا الْيَتَامَىٰ حَتَّىٰ إِذَا بَلَغُوا النِّكَاحَ فَإِنْ آنَسْتُم مِّنْهُمْ رُشْدًا فَادْفَعُوا إِلَيْهِمْ أَمْوَالَهُمْ ۖ وَلَا تَأْكُلُوهَا إِسْرَافًا وَبِدَارًا أَن يَكْبَرُوا ۚ وَمَن كَانَ غَنِيًّا فَلْيَسْتَعْفِفْ ۖ وَمَن كَانَ فَقِيرًا فَلْيَأْكُلْ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ ۚ فَإِذَا دَفَعْتُمْ إِلَيْهِمْ أَمْوَالَهُمْ فَأَشْهِدُوا عَلَيْهِمْ ۚ وَكَفَىٰ بِاللَّهِ حَسِيبًا Qurʾān 4:6

“Test the orphans until, when they reach marriageable age, if you perceive sound judgment in them, then deliver their property to them. Do not consume it wastefully and hastily before they grow up. Whoever is wealthy should abstain, and whoever is poor may consume according to what is reasonable. Then, when you deliver their property to them, call witnesses over them. And Allah is sufficient as Reckoner.”

The verse establishes a general legal pattern: when a person reaches maturity and sound judgment, his or her property is returned. In other words, the sane adult becomes legally competent for disposal, taṣarruf.

The Ḥanafī reasoning is not that marriage is identical to sale. Marriage is more serious than sale, because it concerns family, lineage, sexual lawfulness, dower, maintenance, inheritance, and social standing. But it remains an ʿaqd, a contract concluded through offer and acceptance and producing legal effects. Therefore the sane adult woman’s legal capacity is the starting point unless valid evidence removes it.

Two formulations capture the principle:

الْأَصْلُ نَفَاذُ تَصَرُّفِ الْعَاقِلِ الْبَالِغِ فِي حَقِّ نَفْسِهِ. The default is the legal effectiveness of the disposal of a sane adult concerning his or her own right.

And:

الْوِلَايَةُ عَلَى الْحُرِّ الْبَالِغِ الْعَاقِلِ خِلَافُ الْأَصْلِ. Guardianship over a free, sane adult is contrary to the default rule.

These are not quotations from a single named source; they are juristic formulations of the underlying Ḥanafī reasoning. The burden of proof therefore falls on the one who claims that the adult woman’s established capacity is suspended specifically in marriage.

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V. Qurʾānic Evidence for Female Agency in Marriage

The Ḥanafīs cite several Qurʾānic verses in which the act of marriage is grammatically attributed to women themselves. The fullest early treatment is that of al-Jaṣṣāṣ in Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, under the chapter heading بَابُ النِّكَاحِ بِغَيْرِ وَلِيٍّ, “Marriage without a guardian.”

1. Qurʾān 2:232

Allah says:

وَإِذَا طَلَّقْتُمُ النِّسَاءَ فَبَلَغْنَ أَجَلَهُنَّ فَلَا تَعْضُلُوهُنَّ أَنْ يَنْكِحْنَ أَزْوَاجَهُنَّ إِذَا تَرَاضَوْا بَيْنَهُم بِالْمَعْرُوفِ ۗ ذَٰلِكَ يُوعَظُ بِهِ مَن كَانَ مِنكُمْ يُؤْمِنُ بِاللَّهِ وَالْيَوْمِ الْآخِرِ ۗ ذَٰلِكُمْ أَزْكَىٰ لَكُمْ وَأَطْهَرُ ۗ وَاللَّهُ يَعْلَمُ وَأَنتُمْ لَا تَعْلَمُونَ

“When you divorce women and they have reached the end of their waiting period, do not prevent them from marrying their husbands when they mutually agree between themselves in a proper manner. That is an admonition for whoever among you believes in Allah and the Last Day. That is purer and cleaner for you. And Allah knows, while you do not know.”

The key phrase is فَلَا تَعْضُلُوهُنَّ أَنْ يَنْكِحْنَ أَزْوَاجَهُنَّ, “do not prevent them from marrying their husbands.” Al-Jaṣṣāṣ writes:

وَقَدْ دَلَّتْ هَذِهِ الْآيَةُ مِنْ وُجُوهٍ عَلَى جَوَازِ النِّكَاحِ إِذَا عَقَدَتْ عَلَى نَفْسِهَا بِغَيْرِ وَلِيٍّ وَلَا إِذْنِ وَلِيِّهَا: أَحَدُهَا إِضَافَةُ الْعَقْدِ إِلَيْهَا مِنْ غَيْرِ شَرْطِ إِذْنِ الْوَلِيِّ، وَالثَّانِي نَهْيُهُ عَنِ الْعَضْلِ إِذَا تَرَاضَى الزَّوْجَانِ.

This verse indicates, from several angles, the permissibility of marriage when the woman contracts it herself without a guardian and without his permission: the first is that the contract is attributed to her without making the guardian’s permission a condition; the second is that He prohibited obstruction when the two spouses mutually agree.

This is also the verse on which the majority lean, since its occasion of revelation concerns Maʿqil b. Yasār, who refused to let his divorced sister return to her former husband, and the address is directed at him as guardian. In Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī’s account, Maʿqil reports that after the verse came down he obeyed and gave her in marriage, and Ibn Ḥajar, commenting under the chapter affirming the guardian, notes that the report is adduced to show the guardian’s relevance to the contract.

Al-Jaṣṣāṣ anticipates this reading and answers it directly. To the objection that prohibiting the guardian’s obstruction presupposes that he holds a right in the matter, he replies that a prohibition does the opposite of establishing a right:

هَذَا غَلَطٌ؛ لِأَنَّ النَّهْيَ يَمْنَعُ أَنْ يَكُونَ لَهُ حَقٌّ فِيمَا نُهِيَ عَنْهُ، فَكَيْفَ يُسْتَدَلُّ بِهِ عَلَى إِثْبَاتِ الْحَقِّ؟

This is a mistake, because a prohibition precludes his having a right in what he is forbidden from; so how can it be used to establish a right?

He then reads “in a proper manner,” bil-maʿrūf, as referring to a fair dower rather than to the guardian’s involvement, and supports this with a striking naskh argument: to make “proper” mean “concluded by the guardian” would nullify what the same verse has just affirmed, namely her capacity to contract, and a single address cannot at once affirm a ruling and abrogate it.

وَذَلِكَ لَا يَكُونُ إِلَّا عَلَى وَجْهِ النَّسْخِ، وَمَعْلُومٌ امْتِنَاعُ جَوَازِ النَّاسِخِ وَالْمَنْسُوخِ فِي خِطَابٍ وَاحِدٍ؛ لِأَنَّ النَّسْخَ لَا يَجُوزُ إِلَّا بَعْدَ اسْتِقْرَارِ الْحُكْمِ وَالتَّمَكُّنِ مِنَ الْفِعْلِ.

That could only be by way of abrogation, and it is established that the abrogating and the abrogated cannot occur in a single address, because abrogation is valid only after a ruling has settled and action upon it has become possible.

This is the same principle set out in section II, now operating from within the classical Ḥanafī reading of the verse itself. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ then notes that this very verse grounds Abū Ḥanīfah’s ruling on dower:

وَلِذَلِكَ قَالَ أَبُو حَنِيفَةَ: إِنَّهَا إِذَا نُقِصَتْ مِنْ مَهْرِ الْمِثْلِ فَلِلْأَوْلِيَاءِ أَنْ يُفَرِّقُوا بَيْنَهُمَا.

For this reason Abū Ḥanīfah said: if she contracts for less than her fair dower, the guardians may have the two separated.

2. Qurʾān 2:230

Allah says:

فَإِن طَلَّقَهَا فَلَا تَحِلُّ لَهُ مِنۢ بَعْدُ حَتَّىٰ تَنكِحَ زَوْجًا غَيْرَهُ ۗ فَإِن طَلَّقَهَا فَلَا جُنَاحَ عَلَيْهِمَا أَن يَتَرَاجَعَا إِن ظَنَّا أَن يُقِيمَا حُدُودَ اللَّهِ ۗ وَتِلْكَ حُدُودُ اللَّهِ يُبَيِّنُهَا لِقَوْمٍ يَعْلَمُونَ

“If he divorces her, she is not lawful for him thereafter until she marries another husband. Then, if he divorces her, there is no blame upon the two of them to return to one another if they think they can uphold the limits of Allah. These are the limits of Allah, which He makes clear for a people who know.”

Al-Jaṣṣāṣ finds two indications here: the contract is attributed to her in حَتَّىٰ تَنكِحَ زَوْجًا غَيْرَهُ, “until she marries another husband,” and the reconciliation is attributed to the two spouses in فَلَا جُنَاحَ عَلَيْهِمَا أَن يَتَرَاجَعَا, with no mention of a guardian.

3. Qurʾān 2:234

Allah says, regarding widows:

وَالَّذِينَ يُتَوَفَّوْنَ مِنكُمْ وَيَذَرُونَ أَزْوَاجًا يَتَرَبَّصْنَ بِأَنفُسِهِنَّ أَرْبَعَةَ أَشْهُرٍ وَعَشْرًا ۖ فَإِذَا بَلَغْنَ أَجَلَهُنَّ فَلَا جُنَاحَ عَلَيْكُمْ فِيمَا فَعَلْنَ فِي أَنفُسِهِنَّ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ ۗ وَاللَّهُ بِمَا تَعْمَلُونَ خَبِيرٌ

“Those of you who die and leave wives behind: they shall wait by themselves four months and ten days. Then, when they have reached the end of their term, there is no blame upon you concerning what they do with themselves in a proper manner. And Allah is fully aware of what you do.”

Al-Jaṣṣāṣ comments that the verse permits “what they do with themselves” without making the guardian a condition, and that to impose the guardian as a condition of validity would negate what the verse establishes. The argument across the three verses is cumulative, not merely grammatical. The Qurʾān repeatedly speaks of women marrying, remarrying, mutually agreeing, and acting concerning themselves. To impose a guardian as an absolute condition of validity requires evidence strong enough to qualify that Qurʾānic pattern.

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VI. The Counter-Evidence: “There Is No Marriage Without a Guardian”

The majority rely heavily on the ḥadīth:

لَا نِكَاحَ إِلَّا بِوَلِيٍّ

There is no marriage except with a guardian.

They also cite the ḥadīth of ʿĀʾishah:

أَيُّمَا امْرَأَةٍ نَكَحَتْ بِغَيْرِ إِذْنِ وَلِيِّهَا فَنِكَاحُهَا بَاطِلٌ، فَنِكَاحُهَا بَاطِلٌ، فَنِكَاحُهَا بَاطِلٌ، فَإِنْ دَخَلَ بِهَا فَلَهَا الْمَهْرُ بِمَا اسْتَحَلَّ مِنْ فَرْجِهَا، فَإِنِ اشْتَجَرُوا فَالسُّلْطَانُ وَلِيُّ مَنْ لَا وَلِيَّ لَهُ.

Any woman who marries without the permission of her guardian, her marriage is invalid, her marriage is invalid, her marriage is invalid. If he consummates with her, she is entitled to the dower for what he has made lawful of her. And if they dispute, then the ruler is the guardian of one who has no guardian.

There are variant wordings. Some narrations use the active نَكَحَتْ, “any woman who marries,” and others use passive or causative forms such as نُكِحَتْ or لَمْ يُنْكِحْهَا الْوَلِيُّ. The active wording, which is the form in the Tirmidhī narration, is useful for the discussion because even the counter-evidence linguistically casts the woman as the contracting subject, though the majority still read the report as requiring the guardian for validity.

The Ḥanafīs do not ignore these reports. They answer them through several layers.

1. The Uṣūl Response

The reports are not mutawātir. They are solitary, akhbār āḥād. They may establish a legal meaning, but they cannot, on the Ḥanafī method, add an absolute validity-condition to the unrestricted Qurʾānic agency of the adult woman, since that addition would function as ziyādah ʿalā al-naṣṣ. (See Section II).

The Ḥanafī response is therefore not “the ḥadīth is meaningless.” It is that the ḥadīth must be interpreted in a way that preserves the Qurʾānic generality and the established legal capacity of the sane adult woman.

2. The Interpretive Response: Negation May Mean Incompleteness

The phrase لَا نِكَاحَ إِلَّا بِوَلِيٍّ may be read as negating validity, which is the majority reading. The Ḥanafīs read it as negating full propriety, completeness, or protected soundness in cases where the guardian’s legitimate right is bypassed. This is a recognized interpretive pattern. The Prophet ﷺ said:

لَا يُؤْمِنُ أَحَدُكُمْ حَتَّىٰ يُحِبَّ لِأَخِيهِ مَا يُحِبُّ لِنَفْسِهِ

None of you truly believes until he loves for his brother what he loves for himself.

This does not mean such a person has no faith at all; it means his faith is incomplete. A still closer parallel is:

لَا صَلَاةَ بِحَضْرَةِ الطَّعَامِ

There’s no prayer when food is present.

This is not understood to mean prayer is invalid in the presence of food. Likewise the Ḥanafīs understand “no marriage” as negating the complete, proper, socially protected form of marriage, not necessarily the legal existence of every contract a sane adult woman concludes.

3. The “Bāṭil” Clause and the Sulṭān Clause

The ḥadīth says فَنِكَاحُهَا بَاطِلٌ, “her marriage is invalid.” This is the strongest wording against the Ḥanafī position.

A weak version of the Ḥanafī reply would be to say that the ḥadīth grants her the dower after consummation, and that dower follows only from a valid contract. That is too simple. In fiqh, dower may become due after consummation even in a defective contract, nikāḥ fāsid, or in a case of legal ambiguity, shubhah. So the dower clause alone does not prove full validity.

The stronger point is that the report itself does not treat the case as mere fornication; it attaches legal effects to the relationship: dower, dispute, and judicial guardianship. The clause:

فَإِنِ اشْتَجَرُوا فَالسُّلْطَانُ وَلِيُّ مَنْ لَا وَلِيَّ لَهُ

And if they dispute, then the ruler is the guardian of one who has no guardian

is especially telling. It envisions a process to be adjudicated, not a relationship treated as nonexistent from every angle. This supports reading the report in a more limited way rather than as a blanket cancellation of adult female legal capacity.

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VII. The Practice of ʿĀʾishah and the Limits of the Argument

A supporting Ḥanafī argument concerns the practice of ʿĀʾishah herself, narrator of the most explicit variant. It is reported in Mālik’s Muwaṭṭaʾ that ʿĀʾishah gave her niece Ḥafṣah bt. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān in marriage to al-Mundhir b. al-Zubayr while Ḥafṣah’s father was absent in Syria:

أَنَّ عَائِشَةَ زَوْجَ النَّبِيِّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ زَوَّجَتْ حَفْصَةَ بِنْتَ عَبْدِ الرَّحْمَنِ الْمُنْذِرَ بْنَ الزُّبَيْرِ وَعَبْدُ الرَّحْمَنِ غَائِبٌ بِالشَّامِ، فَلَمَّا قَدِمَ عَبْدُ الرَّحْمَنِ قَالَ: وَمِثْلِي يُصْنَعُ هَذَا بِهِ؟ وَمِثْلِي يُفْتَاتُ عَلَيْهِ؟ فَكَلَّمَتْ عَائِشَةُ الْمُنْذِرَ بْنَ الزُّبَيْرِ، فَقَالَ الْمُنْذِرُ: فَإِنَّ ذَلِكَ بِيَدِ عَبْدِ الرَّحْمَنِ، فَقَالَ عَبْدُ الرَّحْمَنِ: مَا كُنْتُ لِأَرُدَّ أَمْرًا قَضَيْتَهُ، فَقَرَّتْ حَفْصَةُ عِنْدَ الْمُنْذِرِ، وَلَمْ يَكُنْ ذَلِكَ طَلَاقًا.

ʿĀʾishah, the wife of the Prophet ﷺ, gave Ḥafṣah bt. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān in marriage to al-Mundhir b. al-Zubayr while ʿAbd al-Raḥmān was absent in Syria. When ʿAbd al-Raḥmān returned, he said, “Is someone like me treated like this? Is someone like me bypassed?” ʿĀʾishah then spoke to al-Mundhir b. al-Zubayr, and al-Mundhir said, “The matter is in ʿAbd al-Raḥmān’s hand.” ʿAbd al-Raḥmān said, “I would not undo a matter that you have concluded.” So Ḥafṣah remained with al-Mundhir, and that was not a divorce.

This supports the Ḥanafī claim that the early material was not always understood through the later majority formulation in its most absolute form.

The argument must, however, be stated with limits. The majority can respond that ʿAbd al-Raḥmān’s eventual acceptance functioned as a delayed ratification, and other reports suggest that in such cases the contract itself was concluded by a male relative, which complicates a simple reading of her practice. The sound formulation is therefore narrow: the practice attributed to ʿĀʾishah does not by itself prove the entire Ḥanafī doctrine, but it does show that the early material is complex and that the guardian reports were not treated by all early authorities as the later majority doctrine treats them.

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VIII. Kafāʾah: The Ḥanafī Safeguard

The Ḥanafī position does not mean unrestricted marriage without family consequence. The key safeguard is kafāʾah, suitability.

Al-Kāsānī states that suitability is relevant precisely where a free, sane, adult woman marries herself without the approval of her guardians:

وَمِنْهَا كَفَاءَةُ الزَّوْجِ فِي إِنْكَاحِ الْمَرْأَةِ الْحُرَّةِ الْبَالِغَةِ الْعَاقِلَةِ نَفْسَهَا مِنْ غَيْرِ رِضَا الْأَوْلِيَاءِ بِمَهْرِ مِثْلِهَا.

Among them is the suitability of the husband in the case where a free, adult, sane woman marries herself, without the approval of the guardians, for her fair dower.

He then explains that suitability here is a condition of bindingness, sharṭ luzūm, not of original validity:

فَالنِّكَاحُ الَّذِي الْكَفَاءَةُ فِيهِ شَرْطُ لُزُومِهِ هُوَ إِنْكَاحُ الْمَرْأَةِ نَفْسَهَا مِنْ غَيْرِ رِضَا الْأَوْلِيَاءِ.

The marriage in which suitability is a condition of its bindingness is the case where the woman marries herself without the approval of the guardians.

The logic is clear. The adult woman’s legal capacity is real, but marriage also affects family standing and social consequences. If she marries a suitable man, the guardian has no basis to object merely because he did not conduct the contract. If she marries a non-suitable man, the guardian’s protective right becomes legally meaningful, and this is where the maxim applies:

الضَّرَرُ يُزَالُ

Harm is to be removed.

But the harm must be legally recognized, not mere displeasure or arbitrary control.

Later Ḥanafī fatwa literature became more restrictive in some contexts, especially on account of fasād al-zamān, social deterioration and the misuse of the licence. As noted in Section I, al-Lubāb records that although the apparent narration permits even a marriage to a non-suitable man subject to the guardian’s objection, a further narration from Abū Ḥanīfah and Abū Yūsuf disallows it in the case of non-suitability, and this was adopted as the fatwa position in some later works. Ibn ʿĀbidīn records and discusses the later fatwa tendency to restrict the unrestricted application of this ruling in cases involving lack of kafāʾah, deficient dower, or social harm, especially under conditions of fasād al-zamān.

The careful Ḥanafī formulation is therefore this: the adult woman’s self-contracted marriage is valid in principle, but where the husband is non-suitable, the guardian’s objection may prevent its bindingness or lead to judicial annulment, according to the details of the madhhab and later fatwa practice.

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IX. Comparative Perspective

School	Guardian’s Role	Legal Result
Shāfiʿī	Condition of validity (rukn)	Marriage without a walī is void
Ḥanbalī	Condition of validity	Marriage without a walī is void
Mālikī	The walī is, in the settled later school, a pillar of the contract; the well-known distinction is between guardianship of compulsion and of recommendation, not between classes of women	Required for validity, with internal discussion, but the later school is not “soft” on the requirement
Ḥanafī	Not a universal condition of validity for a free, sane, adult woman	Valid in principle, with kafāʾah and the guardian’s objection as safeguards

A note on the Mālikī school is necessary, because it is sometimes misread as close to the Ḥanafī view. Some early Mālikī transmissions distinguish between a woman of lower social standing, who may appoint a man to conclude her marriage, and a woman of standing, who is married by her guardians or by the ruler. Al-Bināyah reports such a nuance from Mālik but also notes that the transmission is disputed and that the more accurate report concerns the case where a non-guardian conducts the marriage and the guardian or ruler later approves it. The settled later Mālikī madhhab, as in Mukhtaṣar Khalīl and its commentaries, treats the guardian as a pillar of the contract and gives him a far stronger role than the Ḥanafīs do.

The decisive fault line, then, is not the texts, which all four schools possess, but the uṣūl through which they are read. For the majority, the guardian reports are sound solitary narrations that establish a condition of validity, and the marriage verses are read as compatible with or even supportive of that condition. For the Ḥanafīs, the decisive generality of the Qurʾān, the bar on adding conditions to a decisive text by solitary report, the woman’s established legal capacity, the analogy to her other contracts, the availability of a non-perfection reading of the guardian reports, and the complexity of the early practice combine to validate her contract while preserving the family’s interest through kafāʾah.

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X. The Best Ḥanafī Formulation

The most defensible formulation is this:

According to the Ḥanafī school, a free, sane, adult woman possesses the legal capacity to contract her own marriage. The guardian is recommended, socially important, and legally protective, but he is not a universal condition for the validity of her marriage contract. The Qurʾān attributes marriage agency to women, and the Ḥanafīs do not allow solitary reports to add an absolute validity-condition to those Qurʾānic generalities. The guardian ḥadīths are accepted but interpreted in light of propriety, completeness, the cases of minors and those lacking capacity, disputed cases, and cases where the guardian’s legitimate right is violated. If the husband is suitable and the ordinary conditions of marriage are fulfilled, the marriage is valid and binding. If the husband is not suitable, the guardian may object and seek judicial intervention.

This avoids two errors. The first is the polemical claim that the Ḥanafīs disregard ḥadīth; they do not, but interpret it through their uṣūl. The second is the modern individualist claim that the Ḥanafī position makes the guardian irrelevant; it does not, since the guardian remains important, though not as an absolute condition of validity for the contract of a sane adult woman.

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Conclusion

The Ḥanafī position on marriage without a guardian is not an isolated anomaly. It is the product of a coherent legal method. The school begins with adult legal capacity, ahliyyah. It reads the Qurʾānic verses as attributing agency to women in marriage and remarriage. It treats the guardian ḥadīths as authoritative but not strong enough, on their own, to add an absolute validity-condition to the Qurʾānic framework. It then preserves the guardian’s protective function through kafāʾah, appropriate dower, and the right of judicial objection.

The Ḥanafī ruling is therefore neither a rejection of the Sunnah nor a theory of unrestricted autonomy. It is a juristic balance between textual hierarchy, legal capacity, family protection, and the removal of harm. The most accurate summary is this:

According to the Ḥanafīs, the sane adult woman has the legal capacity to contract her own marriage, while the guardian retains a protective right where the marriage violates suitability or causes legally recognized harm.

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Sources

1. al-Maydānī, al-Lubāb fī Sharḥ al-Kitāb, Kitāb al-Nikāḥ.
2. al-Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-Ṣanāʾiʿ fī Tartīb al-Sharāʾiʿ, Faṣl Wilāyat al-Nadb wa-l-Istiḥbāb fī al-Nikāḥ, and Faṣl Sharṭ Kafāʾat al-Zawj.
3. al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, Aḥkām Sūrat al-Baqarah, Bāb al-Nikāḥ bi-ghayr Walī (on Q 2:230, 2:232, 2:234).
4. al-Tirmidhī, al-Jāmiʿ, Kitāb al-Nikāḥ (the ḥadīth ayyumā imraʾatin nakaḥat…).
5. Ibn Ḥajar, Fatḥ al-Bārī, Kitāb al-Nikāḥ, Bāb man qāla lā nikāḥa illā bi-walī.
6. al-ʿAynī, al-Bināyah Sharḥ al-Hidāyah, Bāb fī al-Awliyāʾ wa-l-Akfāʾ (on the Mālikī transmission).
7. Ibn ʿĀbidīn, Radd al-Muḥtār ʿalā al-Durr al-Mukhtār, Kitāb al-Nikāḥ (on the later fatwa restriction).

 

The Hanbali Prohibition on Remuneration for Religious Instruction

Abstract: In recent years, a shift has occurred in the dissemination of Islamic knowledge in the West, characterized by the commodification of religious instruction. This article examines the authoritative (muʿtamad) position of the Hanbali school regarding the permissibility of charging a fixed wage (ujrah) for teaching the Qur’an, Fiqh, and Hadith. Through an analysis of the primary texts of the later school (muta’akhkhirīn), it is demonstrated that such contracts are juristically invalid (bāṭil) and religiously prohibited (ḥarām) due to the inherent contradiction between acts of proximity (qurbah) and financial exchange.

I. Jurisprudential Framework: The Nature of Qurbah

The Hanbali school is distinguished by its strict adherence to taqwā (God-consciousness) and zuhd (asceticism), prioritizing spiritual validity over worldly utility. A fundamental legal maxim in the school posits that acts of worship cannot serve as the subject matter for a valid contract of hire (ijārah).

The logic underpinning this prohibition is the concept of Ikhlāṣ (sincerity). An act deemed qurbah—one performed to draw near to Allah—must be dedicated solely to Him. To condition such an act upon a financial transaction corrupts the intention, transforming an eschatological investment into a worldly trade. This strictness is mirrored in other Hanbali rulings, such as the invalidity of prayer performed with an ablution made from usurped water, or the nullification of ṣalāh if one supplicates for worldly matters (e.g., a specific spouse or wealth) using non-scriptural wording.

Therefore, the principle is established: عَمَلٍ يَخْتَصُّ أَنْ يَكُونَ فَاعِلُهُ مِنْ أَهْلِ القُرْبَةِ “[A contract is invalid upon] an action which is specific such that its doer must be from the people of Qurbah [i.e., a Muslim].”

II. Textual Analysis of the Authoritative Sources

The prohibition is not a peripheral opinion but is enshrined in the core texts of the muta’akhkhirīn (later scholars).

1. Al-Rawḍ al-Murbiʿ

Imam Manṣūr al-Buhūtī (d. 1051 AH), the preeminent editor of the later school, elucidates this principle in his commentary on Zād al-Mustaqni’. He writes:

(وَلَا تَصِحُّ) الإجارةُ (عَلَى عَمَلٍ يَخْتَصُّ أَنْ يَكُونَ فَاعِلُهُ مِنْ أَهْلِ القُرْبَةِ)، أي: مسلماً؛ كالحجِّ والأذانِ وتعليمِ القرآنِ؛ لأنَّ مِن شَرطِ هذه الأفعالِ كونُها قربةً إلى اللهِ تعالى، فلم يَجزْ أَخْذُ الأجرةِ عليها، كما لو استأجَرَ قَوْماً يُصلُّون خلفَه. ويجوزُ أَخْذُ رَزْقٍ على ذلك مِن بيتِ المالِ، وجعالةٍ، وأخذٌ بلا شرطٍ.

Translation: “And the contract of hire (ijārah) is not valid for an action which is specified to be performed by a person of qurbah (i.e., a Muslim), such as Hajj, the adhān, and teaching the Qur’an. This is because a condition for these actions is that they are acts of devotion to Allah Almighty; thus, it is not permissible to take a wage (ujrah) for them, just as it would be impermissible to hire people to pray behind oneself. However, it is permissible to receive sustenance (rizq) from the public treasury, a reward (jaʿālah), or [a gift] taken without a prior condition.”

2. The Two Pillars: Sharḥ al-Muntahā and Kashshāf al-Qināʿ

The mu’tamad (relied-upon position) of the madhhab is determined by the agreement of al-Buhūtī’s two major commentaries. Both explicitly extend this prohibition to the teaching of the Islamic sciences.

In Sharḥ Muntahā al-Irādāt, al-Buhūtī provides the scriptural evidence (dalīl) for the ruling:

(وَ) شُرِطَ (كَوْنُ عَمَلٍ) مَعْقُودٍ عَلَيْهِ (لَا يَخْتَصُّ فَاعِلُهُ أَنْ يَكُونَ مِنْ أَهْلِ الْقُرْبَةِ لِكَوْنِهِ مُسْلِمًا) أَيْ: يُشْتَرَطُ إسْلَامُهُ (كَأَذَانٍ وَإِقَامَةٍ) وَإِمَامَةٍ (وَتَعْلِيمِ قُرْآنٍ وَفِقْهٍ وَحَدِيثٍ وَنِيَابَةٍ فِي حَجٍّ وَقَضَاءٍ وَلَا يَقَعُ إلَّا قُرْبَةً لِفَاعِلِهِ وَيَحْرُمُ أَخْذُ أُجْرَةٍ عَلَيْهِ) لِحَدِيثِ عُثْمَانَ بْنِ أَبِي الْعَاصِ «إنَّ آخِرَ مَا عَهِدَ إلَيَّ النَّبِيُّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ أَنْ أَتْخِذْ مُؤَذِّنًا لَا يَأْخُذُ عَلَى أَذَانِهِ أَجْرًا» . وَعَنْ عُبَادَةَ بْنِ الصَّامِتِ قَالَ: «عَلَّمْتُ نَاسًا مِنْ أَهْلِ الصُّفَّةِ الْقُرْآنَ وَالْكِتَابَةَ. فَأَهْدَى إلَيَّ رَجُلٌ مِنْهُمْ قَوْسًا… فَقَصَصْتُ عَلَيْهِ الْقِصَّةَ قَالَ: إنْ سَرَّكَ أَنْ يُقَلِّدَكَ اللَّهُ قَوْسًا مِنْ نَارٍ فَاقْبَلْهَا».

Translation: “…Teaching the Qur’an, Fiqh, and Hadith… cannot be performed except as acts of devotion, and it is forbidden (ḥarām) to take a wage (ujrah) for them. This is established by the hadith of ʿUthmān ibn Abī al-ʿĀṣ: ‘The last instruction the Prophet ﷺ gave me was that I should appoint a caller to prayer who does not take a wage for his adhān.’ And from ʿUbādah ibn al-Ṣāmit… ‘If it pleases you that Allah should place upon you a collar of fire, then accept it [the gift given in exchange for teaching].’“

Similarly, in Kashshāf al-Qināʿ, the prohibition is reiterated with citations from Ibn Ḥamdān:

(ويَحرُم ولا تصح إجارةٌ على عمل يختصُّ فاعله أن يكون من أهل القُربة -وهو المسلِمُ-، ولا يقع) ذلك العمل (إلا قُربة لفاعله، كالحج، أي: النيابة فيه) أي: في الحج (والعمرة، والأذان، ونحوها، كإقامة، وإمامة صلاة، وتعليم قرآن، وفقه، وحديث، وكذا القضاء؛ قاله ابن حمدان) لما روى عُبادة…

Translation: “And it is forbidden (ḥarām), and a contract of hire (ijārah) is not valid for an action which is specified to be performed by a person of qurbah… Examples include Hajj [by proxy], ʿUmrah, the adhān, and similar acts such as the iqāmah, leading prayer, and teaching the Qur’an, Fiqh, and Hadith, as well as judging.”

III. Contemporary Application and Clarification

The ruling remains binding in the modern era, as affirmed by contemporary Hanbali jurists such as Shaykh Aḥmad b. Nāṣir al-Quʿaymī:

قال القعيمي : أهل القُربة – أي: من المسلمين -، فلا تصح الإجارة على الأذان، والإقامة، والإمامة، والقضاء، ويحرم أخذ الأجرة عليها. أما العمل الذي يصح من المسلم والكافر فتجوز الإجارة عليه.

Translation: “Thus, a contract of hire (ijārah) is not valid for the adhān, iqāmah, leading prayer, or judging, and it is forbidden to take a wage for them. As for work that can validly be performed by both a Muslim and a non-Muslim, hire is permissible.”

He explicitly applies this to the religious sciences:

قال ايضاً : لا يصح عقد إجارة على تعليم القرآن، والإمامة، والقضاء، وتعليم العلوم الدينية كالفقه والحديث، والنيابة في الحج، لكن يجوز أخذ الرزق من ولي الأمر عليها.

Translation: “A contract of hire (ijārah) is not valid for teaching the Qur’an… or teaching the religious sciences like Fiqh and Hadith… However, it is permissible to receive sustenance (rizq) for this from the ruler.”

Distinguishing Permissible from Impermissible Income

To properly apply this ruling, one must distinguish between the prohibited contract (ijārah) and permissible forms of financial support.

1. Ujrah (Wage via Contract): Haram. This is a binding contract where money is exchanged for the service of teaching. This is invalid for religious knowledge.
2. Rizq (State Sustenance): Halal. This is a grant from the Bayt al-Māl (public treasury) or a designated endowment (waqf) aimed at supporting the scholar’s livelihood, not a payment for the act of teaching itself.
3. Jaʿālah (Reward/Honorarium): Halal. A commitment to give a reward for a task (e.g., “Whoever teaches my son shall receive X”), distinguished from ijārah by its lack of strict contractual binding on the service provider.
4. Hibah (Gift): Halal. Provided it is voluntary and not a pre-condition of the teaching.

IV. Historical Context and Ethical Implications

The legal ruling is buttressed by the praxis (‘amal) of the Salaf regarding the sanctity of knowledge. Figures such as Imam Mālik, Al-Bukhārī, and Al-Shāfiʿī viewed knowledge as a trust (amānah) to be discharged, not a commodity to be withheld pending payment. The Hanbali position codifies this ethos, preventing the barriers to entry that inevitably arise when religious instruction is commercialized.

The modern trend of students acquiring knowledge gratuitously in the Muslim world (often supported by state rizq) only to return to the West and commercialize that knowledge constitutes a breach of this trust. It contradicts the very barakah (blessing) that characterizes sacred knowledge.

Conclusion

According to the Hanbali school, knowledge of the Qur’an, Fiqh, and Hadith is not a tradeable asset. The consensus of the authoritative texts—Sharḥ al-Muntahā and Kashshāf al-Qināʿ—establishes that charging a fee for such instruction renders the contract void and the income unlawful. Scholars are encouraged to seek provision through state sustenance (rizq) or unconditional rewards (jaʿālah), thereby preserving the sanctity of the act as a pure devotion to Allah.

 

Update

al-Salamu ‘alaykum wa rahmatullahi wa barakatuh!

Thank you to all who have been concerned about my wellbeing and continued to pray for me. May Allah bless you all immensely. Your prayers do make a difference.

I’d like to give an update. I have been inactive on here and online in general for the last several years due to illness, for myself and my family. We have also relocated to another place (in al-Hijaz) and now are starting to settle.

We have much more that we would like to contribute in sharing knowledge and some ambitions for educational projects. In sha Allah we will be sharing more soon.

I’ve recently been informed that much of the work done here on this site has spread to quite a lot of other sites and even some publications. It is a blessing that knowledge spreads. We only ask that you keep it free (please don’t monetise what we refuse to monetise) and reference the original sources. Unfortunately, some have copied the work and presented it as their own.

May Allah bless you all and unite the hearts of the believers against our hidden and apparent enemies!

Abu Ihsan al-Asiri

 

The Soundest Chains of Hadith Narrators

One task I often encourage is to extensively study the strongest chains of narration. Below is a brief summary (and a work in progress) to aid students. Not all the chains of each rank are listed, just the more famous examples.

I suggest reading their biographies in Tahdhib al-Kamal, and summarising the conclusions in one’s own words. To this, one can add which tabaqa they are in according to Ibn Hajar in Taqrib al-Tahdhib. Finally, research these chains in Tuhfah to see which hadiths they have produced and where they can be found.

The Highest Rank

According to al-Bukhari, the strongest chain is:

• Malik – Nafi’ – ‘Abd Allah b. ‘Umar (5:569-596, entries 8321-8401)

This is the so-called ‘Golden Chain’ and has produced about 81 narrations. The best narrator from Malik is al-Shafi’i by the consensus of the scholars, according to Ibn al-Salah.

According to Ahmad b. Hanbal and Ishaq (b. Rahuwayh or Rahuwyah), the strongest chain is:

• Ibn Shihab al-Zuhri – Salim b. ‘Abd Allah b. ‘Umar – ‘Abd Allah b. ‘Umar (5:104-176, entries 6798-7018)

This is another Madinan route to Ibn ‘Umar, whose narrations are fundamental to the transmission of the Sunnah. This one has produced about 221 narrations. Both chains are considered the best Hijazi/Madinan routes, and combined have produced at least 302 narrations, which are the foundations of the Sunnah.

According to Ali al-Madini, Sulayman b. Harb,  ‘Amr b. ‘Ali al-Fallas, and others, the soundest chain is actually:

• Muhammad b. Sirin — ‘Abidah b. ‘Amr — ‘Ali b. Abi Talib (7:102-106, entries 10232-10239)

Ibn al-Madini preferred ‘Abd Allah b. ‘Awn from Ibn Sirin whilst Sulayman b. Harb preferred Ayub al-Sakhtiyani from Ibn Sirin. This chain is notable for being the most respected Caliphal transmission, although only 8 narrations come by this way.

According to Yahya b. Ma’in, ‘Abd Allah b. al-Mubarak, and al-Nasa’i, the soundest chain is:

• Ibrahim al-Nakha’i — ‘Alqamah — ‘Abd Allah b. Mas’ud (6:362-374, entries 9410-9462)

This chain has two main routes. Yahya b. Ma’in preferred al-A’mash from Ibrahim (6:364-375, entries 9417-9439), producing 23 narrations, whereas ‘Abd Allah b. al-Mubarak, Waki’ b. al-Jarrah, and al-Nasa’i preferred the route from Ibrahim as from Mansur b. Mu’tamir from Ibrahim (6:378-383, entries 9450-9460) especially via Sufyan al-Thawri.

This chain is by far the most renowned Iraqi route, producing around 50 narrations, and was even respected by the people of Hijaz such as Malik, notable for their lack of regard for Iraqi transmissions in general. Notable too, is that this route is the main transmission for Abu Hanifah’s fiqh. 

Ibn al-Mubarak used to say that the ones who spoiled the Kufan hadiths were al-A’mash and Abu Ishaq

(قال ابن المبارك : إنما أفسد حديث أهل الكوفة : أبو إسحاق، والأعمشه)

This is because he was described as a mudallis (one who hides links in his hadith chains). In Tahdhib al-Kamal, al-A’mash is described as doing tadlis on over 20 of his teachers, one case more than 100 times. al-Dhahbi said of him in ‘al-Ruwat al-Thiqat al-Mutakallam fihim:’ that he is a proof and preserver although he hid his weak teachers in his chains

(سُلَيْمَان بن مهْرَان الْأَعْمَش حجَّة حَافظ لَكِن يُدَلس عَن الضُّعَفَاء)

In Ibn Rajab al-Hanbali’s Sharh ‘Ilal al-Tirmidhi, ‘Ali b. al-Madini is reported to have said that al-A’mash has a lot of mistakes

(الأعمش كثير الوهم) p.647 in Nur al-Din ‘Itr’s edition. 

The chains above are widely reported to be the soundest chains and are highly regarded with universal esteem. However, academic honesty dictates that one must be critical and investigate every single chain for every single hadith.

The Second Rank

al-Zuhri — ‘Ali b. al-Husayn — al-Husayn — ‘Ali b. Abi Talib (Ibn Abi Shaybah)

al’-A’raj — ‘Ubayd Allah b. Abi Rafi’ — ‘Ali b. Abi Talib 

Yahya b. Sa’id al-Qattan — Sufyan al-Thawri — Sulayman al-Taymi — al-Harith b. Swayd — ‘Ali b. Abi Talib (Ahmad and Yahya b. Ma’in)

Shu’ba — Qatada — Sa’id b. al-Musayyib — Any Sahabi!

‘Abd al-Rahman b. al-Qasim — al-Qasim b. Muhammad — A’isha (Ibn al-Madini)

‘Ubayd Allah b. ‘Umar b. Hafs b. ‘Asim — al-Qasim b. Muhammad — A’isha (Ibn Ma’in and al-Nasa’i)

al-Zuhri — ‘Urwah — A’isha

Abu Zinad ‘Abd Allah b. Dhakwan — Salim — ‘Abd Allah b. ‘Umar (Ibn Ma’in)

Yahya b. Sa’id al-Qattan — ‘Ubayd Allah b. ‘Umar — Nafi’ —  ‘Abd Allah b. ‘Umar (Ahmad says ‘Ubayd Allah is better than Malik and Ayyub from Nafi’, and Abu Hatim al-Razi says Yahya is best from him)

Hammad b. Zayd — Ayub al-Sakhtiyani — Nafi’ — ‘Abd Allah b. ‘Umar (Ahmad)

Hammad b. Zayd — Ayub al-Sakhtiyani — Muhammad b. Sirin — Abu Hurayrah (Ibn al-Madini)

Sulayman b. Harb — Ayub al-Sakhtiyani — Muhammad b. Sirin — Abu Hurayrah (Ibn al-Madini)

Abu Zinad ‘Abd Allah b. Dhakwan — al-A’raj — Abu Hurayrah (al-Bukhari)

Ma’mar — Hammad — Abu Hurayrah

Yahya b. Abi Kathir — Abi Salama b. ‘Abd al-Rahman b. ‘Awf — Abu Hurayrah

Ibn Abi ‘Arubah — Qatadah — Anas b. Malik

Malik — al-Zuhri — Anas b. Malik

Hammad b. Salamah — Thabit — Anas b. Malik

Ibn Jurayj — ‘Ata — Jabir b. ‘Abd Allah

Sufyan b. ‘Uyaynah — ‘Amr b. Dinar — Jabir b. ‘Abd Allah

al-Zuhri — ‘Ubayd Allah b. ‘Abd Allah b. ‘Utbah b. Mas’ud — Ibn ‘Abbas — ‘Umar b. al-Khattab

Burayd b. ‘Abd Allah — (his grandfather) ‘Abu Burdah  — (his father) Abu Musa al-Ash’ari

The Third Rank

al-Layth b Sa’d – Zuhayr (Abu Khaythama) — Abu Zubayr (Muhammad b. Tadrus) —Jabir b. ‘Abd Allah

Simak (Abu Mughirah) — ‘Ikramah — ‘Abd Allah b al-‘Abbas

Abu Bakr b. ‘Ayyash — Abu Ishaq al-Sabi’i (‘Amr b. ‘Abd Allah) — al-Bara’

al-‘Alla’ b. ‘Abd al-Rahman — (his father) ‘Abd al-Rahman — Abu Hurayrah

Suhayl b. Abi Salih — (his father) Abu Salih — Abu Hurayrah

When the hadith scholars mention the second and third ranks, they mean that they are still highly authenticated, but that if there is an apparent conflict, the hadiths of the higher ranks take precedence, due to the narrators’ precision mastery.

Note that ‘Ikramah is in this rank and he is a controversial figure due to his affiliation with the Khawarij. al-Dhahbi mentions this in al-Mizan al-I’tidal, entry #5716 (v.3, p.93). Al-Bukhari relied upon him because he believed that the Khawarij wouldn’t lie as for them lying is a sin and sin is kufr. Muslim and Malik mostly avoided ‘Ikramah’s narrations except in a few instances.

As an aside, it is interesting that earlier Muslim scholars accepted innovators such as al-Khawarij to a degree for several reasons which I won’t go into now. You have figures such as ‘Imran b. Hittan, another Khariji, whose narrations are used by al-Bukhari, Abu Dawud, and al-Nasa’i. Abu Dawud said that from the people of desires (i.e. innovators), none are more correct in hadith than the Khawarij

(قال أبو داود : ليس في أهل الأهواء أصح حديثا من الخوارج ، ثم ذكر عمران بن حطان ، وأبا حسان الأعرج.).

As you might have noticed, many of these chains of transmission are family routes from grandfather to grandson and so on. One question for students is, why do you think this is so?

 

Mukhtasar Tuhfat al-Muhtaj

N.B. I haven’t posted for a while, partly due to various illnesses in myself and my family. Prayers please!

One of the most difficult books in the Shafi’i school also happens to be one of the most highly regarded: Tuhfat al-Muhtaj of Ibn Hajar al-Haythami. It’s difficulty makes it almost inaccessible in parts for all but the most grounded shaykhs of the madhab.

This difficulty may be in part due to the short space of time in which it was written, without the extended lengths of time that aid in refinement and clarification. My guess is that the work was written in a first edition/draft (it was completed in less than a year) and then taken and spread from Makkah worldwide by the shaykhs multitude of students before a revision could be made.

Elsewhere, I have mentioned and recommended the four volume abridgement, by Mustafa b. Hamid b. Hasan b. Sumayt, which was published in Tarim. Don’t let the poor quality of the binding and paper deceive you! This is a magnificent book by a truly brilliant young scholar of the madhab.

His approach in the abridgement is as follows:

Summarising the research of Ibn Hajar at the end of each investigation, and substituting difficult phrases, where necessary for clarification, with expressions from the other commentaries and marginal notes, including from Ibn Hajar’s other works such as Fath al-Jawwad, al-Imdad, Sharh al-Ubab, al-Fatawa, etc. When these don’t suffice, he uses clear phrasing of his own coining. The result is a much clearer commentary that gets to the point at hand. In the footnotes, are clarifications of the ore obscure words.

Focusing on the fiqhi issues, rearranging where necessary, whilst removing most of the discussions around usul, grammar, hadith, etc.

Mentioning, in the footnotes, important differences with Khatib, Zakariyya al-Ansari, and the Ramlis, all gleamed from al-Sharwani’s Hashiyah.

Correcting the many typographical errors found in the first printed edition, in 10-volumes with the hashiyatayn of ‘Abd al-Hamid and Ibn Qasim.

It is a truly useful work that I find beneficial, so much so that I now refer to this Mukhtasar over Tuhfah. I highly recommend it to serious students of fiqh.

 

What Follows the Four?

There is a famous quote from Ibn ‘Abd al-Salam, recorded by al-Dhahabi in his Siyar:

‘I have not seen, in all the books of knowledge in Islam, anything comparable to:

(1) Ibn Hazm’s al-Muhalla

(2) nor Shaykh Muwaffaq al-Din (Ibn Qudamah)’s al-Mughni

Shams al-Dhahabi then added:

‘Shaykh ‘Izz al-Din spoke the truth! And the third is al-Bayhaqi’s (3) al-Sunan al-Kabir, and the fourth is Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr’s (4) al-Tamhid. Whoever acquires these (four) volumes, whilst being an intelligent mufti, and persists in reviewing them, then he truly is a scholar.’ (Siyar 18:193)

What they all have in common is an encyclopedic approach to hadith and fiqh, truly striving to arrive at the essence of the Sunnah. Now then, a number of later scholars, after quoting the above, have attempted to extend the list to include other candidates for absolutely essential masterpieces that a scholar cannot do without.

Dr. Abdullah al-Turki adds Sharh al-Sunnah by al-Baghawi to this list it in his introduction to his edition of al-Bayhaqi’s Sunan al-Kabir. Whilst reading al-Dhahabi’s entry on al-Baghawi in Siyar (v. 19, p. 439), I found the following footnote by Shaykh Shu’ayb on Sharh al-Sunnah:

‘It is a magnificent book in its field, without which no seeker of knowledge can suffice, for it is from the most esteemed books of the Prophetic model that have reached us from the heritage of the predecessors in terms of arrangement and refinement, harmonization and precision… It demonstrates the expertise of its author, may God have mercy on him, in the noble Prophetic traditions and their criticism, his knowledge of chains of transmission and their hidden defects, erudition in the schools of thought of the Companions and their Followers, the leaders of the various lands and independent jurists. I do not know of another book on the Sunnah that enriches one in the way that it does.’

A most obvious candidate for the list also happens to be the most commonly cited among contemporaries, namely Fath al-Bari by Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani.

Muhammad al-Shawkani, who was considered to be a mujtahid (independent jurist) was asked why he hadn’t written a commentary on Sahih al-Bukhari, as other scholars (some of arguably lesser standing) had done, and replied by paraphrasing the hadith: ‘la hijra ba’d al-fath.’ i.e. ‘(There is) no (reward for) migration (to Madinah) after the conquest (of Makkah).’ By this he meant that after Fath al-Bari, no other commentary on Sahih al-Bukhari was necessary, as Ibn Hajar had accomplished all that could be accomplished.

Another book mentioned, though overlooked by al-Dhahabi (perhaps because it is incomplete), is al-Majmu’ Sharh al-Muhadhab by al-Nawawi. Ibn Kathir said of it in his entry on al-Nawawi in al-Bidayah wa al-Nihayah that he does not know of any book of fiqh better than it.

Also frequently mentioned are al-Awsat and its abridgement al-Ishraf by Ibn al-Mundhir, both of which were abridged from the lost al-Mabsut. Although both have been published in recent decades, both publications are incomplete (with a substantial amount of volumes from the manuscripts left unedited and unpublished). The sections that have been published, however, leave nobody in doubt about the value of the books and the indisputable mastery of ijtihad that Ibn al-Mundhir had. Ibn Hazm considerd him to be one of the few mujtahid mutlaqs to come after the time of Ahmad b. Hanbal and Ishaq b. Rahuwayh.

Finally, my own choice, is Tarh al-Tathrib by al-Iraqi. It’s simply outstanding.

So, these are the books that are deemed essential:

• al-Muhalla
• al-Mughni
• al-Sunan al-Kabir
• al-Tamhid
• Sharh al-Sunnah
• al-Majmu’
• Fath al-Bari
• al-Awsat/al-Ishraf
• Tarh al-Tathrib

 

Some Advice on How to Study Fiqh

I was asked this question and encouraged to share the answer.

Question:

How can one study fiqh in a way that builds mastery?

Answer:

This is an excellent question. The method of instruction in contemporary fiqh studies (and other Islamic studies) leaves much to be desired. Unfortunately, many scholars and students are ignorant of pedagogy, educational psychology, etc. 

Let me explain how this can help with studying al-fiqh al-Shafi’i. Remember that the onus is on the student to do this. 

Review (tiqrar) key concepts (shurut, arkan, ta’rifat) with understanding and memorization. An excellent text to review and memorise key concepts is al-Yaqut al-Nafis, which basically lists ta’rifat, shurut, and arkan. This text is key in Tarim, and some teachers set exams whereby you basically regurgitate the ta’rifat, shurut, and arkan. These three aspects should be at the heart of one’s review and memorization. Schedule your review sessions according to your time. For example, Sundays for ibadah, Mondays for jiniyat, Tuesdays for al-ahwal al-shakhsiya, etc. You should complete the review of a book of fiqh that you’ve studied at least once every four months. 

Have a notebook for each book studying and make diagrams to visualise concepts and actively engage with one’s learning, and review these notes alongside the textual review. An excellent text with which to compare one’s own diagrams and charts is al-Taqrirat al-Sadidah. Some of these could be inspiration for your own diagrams too. ‘Imad ‘Ali Jumu’ah’s Tashjir series is an supurb example of what one should do. He basically takes famous mutun and re-writes them in diagram format.

Seek guidance from teachers about supplementary readings – this is very important as much can be learnt from targeted, focused, extensive readings to widen, and deepen one’s understanding. So read at least one similar book alongside one’s formal text book. For example, whilst reading Minhaj al-Talibin one should at the least also personally read Rawdat al-Talibin issue by issue. These two complement each other beautifully. 

Prepare for the class by reading the forthcoming section of the text (this can help with preparing questions) alongside the commentary at a ratio of 3:1 so that for every hour of formal class you do at least three hours of preparation. So, for example, if you are studying Matn Abi Shuja’ and the next class will be on bab umm al-walad, read the sharh for the section ahead of class from Hashiyat al-Bajuri, al-Iqna’, and Kifayat al-Akhyar. Compare the differences in elucidation. Compile a summarised commentary from all.

Think of taswir of masa’il through practical examples of application. So, as an example for mirath, what is the estate division if the deceased left behind a mother, a son, a daughter, and a wife? Think of your own case and those of others you know.

Understand the ta’lil, where possible, and consider questions arising from that. One of the best texts for this is Nihayat al-Matlab by Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwayni. So, the ta’lil for washing hands upon waking before putting them in a basin is because the Sahaba’s standard practice was to do istijmar (not istinja’) and they slept naked in the sweaty heat, thus traces of urine or stool may have touched their hands during their sleep. If you do istinja’ and sleep with underwear is the issue of washing hands upon waking up still applicable?

Understand how the issue has been arrived at from the tadlil. Al-Majmu’, al-Bayhaqi’s books, and al-Mu’tamad are excellent for this. I would say for most students they should only memorise the adilla for the contentious issues, not the ones upon which most agree. Be efficient. So, don’t focus on the evidence for the obligation of Ramadan (upon which almost all schools agree, but do on why touching a marriageable member of the opposite sex invalidates your ritual purity.

From your notes and readings, write your own companion book including everything you have covered. This will be a handy reference for masa’il in future. If it’s really good, you can even distribute it to others.

I hope this helps!

 

Advice for Beginning Students of Hadith

During the Eid break, we had the pleasure of hosting my wife’s uncle Abu Ahmad – a PhD in ‘ulum al-hadith and dean of a university in Riyadh. We only get to see him a couple of times a year but each time is fruitful with wise advice on attaining success in this life and the next.

One discussion we had was on how newly-practicing Muslims can gain a firm grounding in the basics of hadith. He said that he thinks Ibn Daqiq al-‘Id’s sharh on al-Arba’un al-Nawawiyyah is an excellent abridged commentary for beginners to become familiar with the Sunnah. We discussed the authorship of this well-known commentary, with the contenders being Ibn Daqiq al-‘Id (the traditional view), Ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalani (according to Riyadh al-‘Isa and ‘Abd al-Qadir Taha), and Imam al-Nawawi himself. Either way, each one is a great imam of hadith and the work is outstanding.

On the subject of ‘ulum and mustalah al-hadith, he really likes Taysir Mustalah al-Hadith by Mahmud al-Tahan due to its simplicity and organization of material for assisting beginners.

Abu Ahmad emphasized that, ultimately, students at an intermediate level must strive to understand Abdullah al-Juday’s two-volume aptly-titled Tahrir ‘Ulum al-Hadith. He said that no other contemporary book has been written like it. It summarizes the entire field whilst making original contributions with piercing insight. It is a book from which even scholars benefit. He said that shaykh Abdullah is a mujtahid in the field and highlighted his mastery of usul al-fiqh as well.

He added the caveat that, whilst scholars may disagree in furu’ (even in ‘aqa’id – tafwidh an example), they are united on the usul. This touches upon the controversy that surrounds some of Shaykh Abdullah’s published research, which has attracted (somewhat excessive in my view) criticism from some quarters due to its originality in overturning long-held views with reasoning and evidence.

 

The Book of Hajj (from The Hadrami Primer)

Hajj is almost upon us, and it is advisable to review the fiqh of Hajj every year before it starts. What follows is a translation and commentary from al-Muqaddimah al-Hadramiyyah by A. S. Gorin, from a manuscript that will be published in future in sha Allah. The importance of the text has been explained elsewhere in previous posts. In short, it is one of the most important teaching primers of the post-Shaykhayn period of the Shafi’i school, and has attracted a number of important commentaries and glosses. It is still studied accross the Indian Ocean basin and further beyond in Syria and Kurdistan.

KEY

H: Ibn Hajar’s commentary from al-Manhaj al-Qawim

T: al-Tarmasi’s gloss on Ibn Hajar’s commentary

B: Ba’Ishn’s commentary from Bushra al-Karim

A: The translator’s commentary

The Book of Hajj and ‘Umrah

They (A: i.e. Hajj and ‘Umrah) are both obligatory. The preconditions for their obligation are:

1. Islam;
2. freedom;
3. legal responsibility;
4. and ability.

(A: Ability) has five sub conditions:

1. Availability of provisions and containers; enough for going and returning;
2. Availability of a vehicle (A: including riding animals and mounts) for one who has two stages between him and Makkah; or a carriage for one who cannot sit on a mount, and for a woman with a partner. A vehicle is not a condition for the one who has less than two stages between him and Makkah whilst able to walk. It is a condition that the aforementioned is in excess of one’s debt, provision for those one must provide for till returning, housing and a servant if needed.
3. The route is safe.
4. Presence of food and water in expected places, wherefrom one can purchase with a reasonable price according to place and time. [A: This includes] the feed for one’s riding animal at every stage. Hajj is not obligatory on the woman, unless her husband goes with her, or an unmarriageable kin or trustworthy women.
5. Ability to remain mounted on the vehicle without great difficulty. Hajj is not obligatory on a blind man unless he finds a guide.

Whoever cannot perform Hajj himself, it is obligatory on him to find one to deputise for him, if he has enough money and finds one who will obey him; except if the distance between him and Makkah is less than the distance for shortening prayer, in which case it is binding on him to perform, in person.

On the Timing of Hajj and Umrah

One may enter the state of pilgrim sanctity for Umrah at any time. [A: However, for] Hajj [A: entering pilgrim sanctity must be done] in its [A: set] months. These are: Shawwal, Dhu al-Qa’dah and the first ten [A:days] of Dhu al-Hijjah. If one enters the pilgrim sanctity for Hajj outside these times, it is considered Umrah. Whoever is in Makkah enters the state of pilgrim sanctity for Hajj from it; and for Umrah from the closest area of al-Hil (A: at Masjid al-Tan’im, known as Masjid A’isha locally).

A non-Makkan must enter the state pilgrim sanctity for Hajj and Umrah from the designated sites. These are:

For (A: people coming from) Tihamah of Yemen: Yalamlam;

for (A: people coming from) Najd: Qarn;

for the people of Iraq: Dhatu ‘Irq;

for the people of Syria, Egypt and North Africa: al-Juhfah (A: near Rabigh);

and for the people of al-Madinah: Dhu al-Hulayfah.

One who passes by the designated sites, intending the rites, then later enters a state of pilgrim sanctity must sacrifice if he does not return to the set site before starting any of the rites. Entering the state of pilgrim sanctity at the designated site is better than from one’s town (H: as this follows the Sunnah).

On the Integrals of Hajj and Umrah

There are five integrals for Hajj:

1. entering a state of pilgrim sanctity;
2. standing at Arafah;
3. circumambulation around the Ka’ba;
4. traversing between al-Safa and al-Marwa;
5. shaving one’s hair;

There are four integrals for Umrah:

1. entering a state of pilgrim sanctity;
2. circumambulation around the Ka’ba;
3. traversing between al-Safa and al-Marwa;
4. shaving one’s hair;

On Pilgrim Sanctity

Pilgrim sanctity is the intention for doing Hajj or Umrah or both. It is considered an absolute state of pilgrim sanctity, which one may change as one wishes (H: to Hajj, Umrah, or both). It is recommended to utter the intention, saying: “I intend Hajj, or Umrah, and I enter a state of pilgrim sanctity for it for Allah, the Exalted.” If one performs Hajj or Umrah on behalf of another, one says: “I intend Hajj or Umrah on behalf of so-and-so, and I enter a state of pilgrim sanctity for it Allah, the Exalted.”

It is recommended to chant the talbiyah with the intention, and to proliferate it, raising one’s voice if male, except on the first instance where one chants quietly.

The talbiyah’s form is: “Ever at Your service, O Allah, ever at Your service. Ever at Your service, You have no partner, ever at Your service. Indeed, All praise, blessings and dominion are Yours. You have no partner.”

One repeats it thrice, and then sends salutations on the Prophet, followed by asking Allah for His pleasure and Paradise, seeking refuge from the Fire. Then, one supplicates for whatsoever one likes. If one in a state of pilgrim sanctity, or another, sees something which delights or displeases one, one says [H: sorrowfully], “Ever at Your service, indeed the (real) life is the life of the Hereafter.”

On Recommended Acts Connected to the Rites

It is recommended to perform a ritual bath for entering a state of pilgrim sanctity, entering Makka, standing at Arafah and Muzdalifah, and stoning on the Appointed Days.

It is recommended to perfume one’s body for pilgrim sanctity, but not one’s clothing, and to wear a mantle and wraparound which are new, or [H: if unavailable] washed, and sandals.

It is recommended to perform two units of prayer, after which one enters into a state of pilgrim sanctity, facing the qiblah at the beginning of one’s commencement.

It is recommended to enter Makkah before the standing [H: at ‘Ararah], and to enter from the north, during the day, walking bare-foot. It is recommended to perform the arrival circumambulation if one is performing Hajj, or Joining, and enters Makkah before the Standing.

On Obligations and Recommended Acts in Circumambulation

The eight obligations of circumambulation are:

1. Covering one’s nakedness;
2. purity from ritual impurity;
3. purity from physical impurity;
4. keeping the Ka’ba to one’s left;
5. beginning at the Black Stone;
6. aligning with it [H: i.e. some of the Black Stone] with all of one’s body;
7. performing circumambulation even times;
8. and to be inside the Mosque and outside the Ka’ba, buttress and Hijr.

The recommended acts are:

1. walking;
2. greeting the Stone, kissing it and placing one’s forehead on it;
3. greeting the Yemeni Corner;
4. reciting the appropriate invocations (however it is not recommended for women to greet and kiss [A: the Black Stone] except in private);
5. jogging for men in the first three cycles of circumambulation, only if this is followed by walking;
6. bearing one’s right shoulder [H: only for males];
7. proximity to the Ka’ba;
8. performing the cycles in succession;
9. and performing two units of prayer after it;

On Travering between al-Safa and al-Marwa

The four obligations of traversing are:

1. beginning the first with al-Safa;
2. beginning the second with al-Marwah;
3. walking between them seven times;
4. and that it is performed after the integral of circumambulation or arrival.

Its recommended acts are:

1. rising a full height on al-Safa and al-Marwah [H: for males];
2. reciting the relevant invocations;
3. supplicating thrice after each time;
4. and walking at the beginning and end, but running in the middle, the place to do so being well-known [A: signified by green lights].

On Standing at Arafah

The obligation of standing is to be present on the plain of Arafah for a moment, after the zenith on the Day of Arafah; even if passing through or sleeping, on the condition that one is sane. The time [A: to do so] remains till dawn.

Its recommended acts are:

1. combining the night with the day;
2. reciting tahlil, takbir, talbiyah, tasbih, Qur’an, salutations upon the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, and to cry profusely with these;
3. facing the Qiblah;
4. ritual purity;
5. veiling;
6. coming out in the Sun;
7. approaching the rocks for men;
8. approaching the margins for women;
9. combining between the two daytime prayers for the traveller;
10. and delaying al-Maghrib to al-Isha for the traveller to combine them at Muzdalifah.

On Shaving the head

The minimal shaving is to remove three hairs. It is recommended to delay it after stoning the Aqabah pillar, and to begin with the right side of the head, facing the Qiblah, encompassing the whole head for men, and shortening for women.

On the Obligations of Hajj

The six obligations of Hajj are:

1. staying overnight at Muzdalifah, being there for an hour after the second half of the night (not being obligatory on one who has a valid legal excuse);
2. stoning the Aqabah Pillar seven times;
3. stoning the Three Pillars on the Appointed Days, each one seven times,
4. staying overnight in Mina during the three nights [A: of the Appointed Days], or the first two nights if one wants to exit during the first exit on the second day;
5. being in a state of pilgrim sanctity from the designated sites;
6. and performing the farewell circumambulation.

On Staying Overnight and Stoning

It is recommended to stay at the Sacred Grove roofless mosque in Muzdalifah, and to take the pebbles for stoning at Aqabah from there. One stops chanting the talbiyah at the beginning of stoning the Aqabah pillar. It is recommended to say takbir with every [H: throwing of a] pebble.

The time for shaving, stoning the Aqabah pillar, and going-forth circumambulation enters after midnight on the night of sacrifice, and the stoning extends to the end of the Appointed Days. The shaving and circumambulation remain absolutely.

It is recommended to initiate the going-forth circumambulation after stoning the Aqabah pillar. One enters Makkah, performs a circumambulation, and walks between al-Safa and al-Marwa if not performed before, and returns to Mina to stay overnight for the nights of the Appointed Days. One stones the three pillars every day of the Appointed Days after the zenith – each one with seven pebbles.

It is a condition of throwing the seven pebbles that they are thrown one at a time [B: so if one throws the seven together all at once it is only considered one throwing].

[A: it is also a condition that] the stoning is done in sequence on each of the Appointed Days [H: starting with the First Pillar near Masjid al-Khayf, followed by the Medial Pillar, and then the Aqabah Pillar – any other sequence is not considered stoning].

[A: it is also a condition] that [H: the stoning] is done between midday and sunset [H: during the Appointed Days, though this view [A: that it is a condition rather than the best time] is weak [T: following Ibn al-Muqri’s view in Rawd al-Talib. Shaykh al-Islam commented on this in Asna al-Mutalib that this follows al-Isnawi’s view and the consideration of al-Rafi’i in al-Sharh al-Saghir. However, the correct view is that [A: stoning after sunset] is permissible as al-Ghazali stated in al-Wajiz, following a statement of al-Shafi’i and supported by Ibn al-Sabbagh in al-Shamil, Ibn al-Salah, and al-Nawawi in al-Manasik. However, it is impermissible to stone before midday].

[A: it is also a condition] that the stoning is done with stones [H: even if a precious stone, ironstone, crystal, onyx, gold, or silver.]

[A: it is also a condition] that the stoning is done by throwing [H: as it is not sufficient to place to stones on the pillars.]

[A: it is also a condition] that the stoning be done with one’s hands [H: not with, for example, a bow, one’s feet, a slingshot, or with one’s mouth.]

[H: Among] the recommended acts [T: of stoning the pillars] is that it be done with stones the size of beans.

Whoever leaves stoning the Aqabah Pillar or some of the Appointed Days, can rectify it in the remaining performance.

Whoever wants to exit Mina on the second day of the Appointed Days, then it is permissible [H: with no blame, as Allah says, ‘whoever hastens [his departure] on the second day, there is no sin upon him.’ [2:203]].

On Release from Hajj

There are two releases from Hajj. The first occurs with any two of the following three:

1. stoning at Aqabah;
2. shaving [H: by removing at least three hairs];
3. and the going-forth circumambulation.

The second release is achieved with the third [A: i.e. the going-forth circumambulation].

With the first [H: release], all the prohibited acts become permissible except marriage [H: i.e. intercourse], its contract, and foreplay with desire.

With the second release, the remainder [H: are permitted [T: i.e intercourse, foreplay, and marriage contract]].

On the Ways of Performing the Rites

The two rituals [B: i.e. Hajj and Umrah] can be performed [A: together] in [T: only three ways]:

The best is ifrad, if one can do Umrah in the [A: same] year of Hajj, and that is performing Hajj followed by Umrah [H: because the narrations about it are greater].

Then, tamattu’, which is performing Umrah followed by Hajj.

Then, qiran, which is entering a state of pilgrim sanctity simultaneously for both, or [T: entering a state of pilgrim sanctity for] Umrah [H: alone, even if before the Hajj months] then entering a state of pilgrim sanctity for Hajj before the [H: legislated] circumambulation.

One performing tamattu’ must [A: sacrifice] blood with four preconditions:

1. that one is not from the people of the Sanctuary, and no further from the Sanctuary than the distance permitted for shortening prayer;
2. entering a state of pilgrim sanctity for Umrah in the months of Hajj;
3. performed in one year;
4. and that one does not return to a designated site.

One performing qiran must [A: sacrifice] blood with two preconditions:

1. that one is not from the people of the Sanctuary;
2. and that one does not return to a designated site, after entering Makka.

On The Bloods

The [A: sacrificial] blood for [A: committing any of the following]:

1. tamattu’;
2. qiran;
3. not entering a state of pilgrim sanctity from a designated site;
4. not stoning;
5. and not staying overnight stay in Muzdalifah and Mina

is a shāh [A: a yearling sheep or a two-year-old goat].

If one is unable [H: to sacrifice, such as not finding an animal which fits the description], one fasts ten days – three during Hajj and seven when one returns to one’s homeland.

On Prohibitions in Pilgrim Sanctity

The following six categories are prohibited during a state of pilgrim sanctity:

1. It is prohibited for a man to cover his head, or a part of it, and to wear a sewn garment on his body or limb; and for a woman it is prohibited to veil her face or to wear gloves.
2. Perfuming one’s body or clothes.
3. Oiling the hair of one’s head or beard.
4. Removing one’s hair or nails.

If one wears [T: in pilgrim sanctity what one is prohibited to wear, as in the first category], or perfumes [T: as in the second category], or oils one’s hair [T: as in the third category], or touches [A: anyone] with desire, or masturbates [H: with one’s own hand or another’s] and ejaculates, deliberately, knowing and out of choice; then one is obliged [H: to sacrifice blood, in contrast to one who does these forgetfully or in ignorance].

If one removes three or more nails in succession [T: as in the fourth category]; or three or more hairs in succession, even if forgetfully, then one is obliged [A: to slaughter] a sacrificial animal [A: which are discussed below], or feed six paupers, each one with half a sa’, or fast three days.

For every hair or nail [A: removed, one must give a pauper] one mudd, or fast one day. For every two hairs or two nails [A: removed, one must give] two mudds or [A: Fast] two days.

1. Intercourse: If one has intercourse, deliberately, knowing and out of choice before the first release for Hajj or before finishing Umrah; one’s rites are void and it becomes obligatory to complete and make them up immediately, as well as sacrificing a camel [A: discussed below]. If unable, [A: one must sacrifice] a cow; if unable, seven shāhs [A: yearling sheep or two-year-old goats]; if unable, [A: one must feed the paupers of the Sanctuary with] food of the same value as a camel; if unable, one must fast the number of mudds [A: i.e. one must fast a day for each mudd of food that the value of a camel buys].
2. Hunting an edible [A: for Muslims] wild [H: beast], or that which is [A: cross] bred from it and another. This is also prohibited inside the Sanctuary on the permissible. It is [A: also] prohibited to cut the moist plants of the Sanctuary and to uproot them, except for cymbopogon [A; lemongrass], thorn plants [H: even if not in one’s path], animal feed, medicine [H: such as colocynth], and crops [H: such as wheat and barley]. It is forbidden to uproot dry grass, but not to cut it.

If one destroys wild game which has its counterpart from cattle, then [A: one must sacrifice] its counterpart [H: in appearance, not in value]. If it does not have a counterpart, one must [A: sacrifice] its value. [A: The value of] an ostrich is a camel; [A: the value of] wild cattle and zebras is a cow; [A: the value of] deer is a shāh [A: a yearling sheep or a two-year-old goat]; [A: the value of] a pigeon is a shāh [A: a yearling sheep or a two-year-old goat].

One has the choice in [A: animals which have a] counterpart between slaughtering its counterpart in the Sanctuary and giving it in charity [H: to the Sanctuary’s paupers]; or giving in charity food of the same value of that counterpart; or fasting the number of mudds [A: one fasts a day for each mudd of food the counterpart buys].

With regards to animals which have no counterpart, like locusts, one has the choice between giving in charity food of the same value of that animal, and fasting the number of mudds [A: one fasts a day for each mudd of food that it buys].

[A: One is obliged] in [A: destroying] a large tree [A: to sacrifice] a yearling cow, and [A: one is obliged] in [A: destroying] a small tree, [H: according to custom, which is] like a seventh [H: approximately] of the large tree, [A: to sacrifice] a shāh [A: a yearling sheep or a two-year-old goat].

One has the choice between slaughtering, giving its value in food, or fasting the number of mudds [A: one fasts a day for each mudd of food that it buys].

[A: One is obliged] in [A: destroying] a very small tree to give its value in food as charity or to fast the number of mudds [A: one fasts a day for each mudd of food that it buys].

On Preventions of Hajj

It is permissible for: parents to prevent their non-Makkan child from entering into a state of pilgrim sanctity for a voluntary Hajj or Umrah, but not for an obligatory [A: Hajj or Umrah]; a husband to prevent his wife from an obligatory and recommended [A: Hajj or Umrah]; and a master to prevent his slave from the obligatory or recommended [A: Hajj or Umrah]. If they [H: i.e. a child, wife, or slave] enter a state of pilgrim sanctity without their [H: i.e. parents, husbands, or masters] permission, they must exit from it.

One who is prevented, or unable to complete, Hajj or Umrah, is released by slaughtering that which suffices as a sacrificial animal, then shaving [A: by cutting at least three hairs], whilst combining of the intention of exiting the state of pilgrim sanctity with these [A: two] acts [H: i.e. sacrificing and shaving]. Whoever is unable to slaughter, feeds [A: paupers] with [A: food equivalent to] the value of a shāh [A: a yearling sheep or a two-year-old goat]. If one is unable, one fasts the number of mudds [A: one fasts a day for each mudd of food that a shāh buys]. A slave is released only with the intention and shaving, and is not obliged to make-up [A: the Hajj or Umrah].

It is permissible to make a condition of release from pilgrim sanctity if one’s provisions become exhausted, or for illness, or another reason.

One who misses standing at Arafah is released by circumambulation, traversing, and shaving. [A: In addition, one must] must make it up, and sacrifice blood like the blood of one doing tamattu’ [A: i.e. a shah, which is yearling sheep or a two-year-old goat]. One slaughters this in the make-up Hajj.

Every obligatory blood must be slaughtered in the Sanctuary, except the blood resulting from impediments. The best place in Hajj is Mina, and the best place in Umrah is on al-Marwah, at any time one wishes, and given to paupers.

On Sacrificial Animals

It [T: i.e. sacrificing [A: during Hajj]] is emphatically recommended. It does not become obligatory except through an oath, or by saying, ‘This is a sacrificial animal,’ or ‘I have made this a sacrificial animal.’

None will suffice except camels, cows, and sheep or goats. The best is a camel, then a cow, then a sheep, then a goat, then a part of a camel. Seven shāhs [A: yearling sheep or two-year-old goats] are better than one camel. The best [H: in terms of colour] is white, then yellow, then tawny, then black-and-white, then black, and then red.

The condition for a camel is that it is five complete years; for a cow or goat that it is two complete years; and for a sheep that it is one complete year.

The animal should not be scabrous, even if a little; with an extreme limp; malnourished; crazy; blind or one-eyed; ill in any way which corrupts the meat; nor must any of its ear be cut off, even if minimal; nor its tongue; nor its udder; nor its rear; nor the outer side of its haunch; nor should all its teeth have gone.

One should intend the sacrifice at the time of slaughtering or before it.

The time for slaughtering begins after sunrise on the Day of Sacrifice, plus the lapse of a time period equal to two units of prayer and two light sermons. This [A: slaughtering period] extends till the end of the Appointed Days.

It is obligatory to give part of its raw meat as charity [H: if it is a voluntary sacrifice]. It is impermissible to sell any of it. An animal sacrificed as an oath must be completely given away in charity. It is detested [H: that one intending sacrifice] removes any of its hair or any other part [H: such as nails and the rest of its body] in the ten days of Dhu al-Hijjah until one sacrifices.

On Cutting a New-born’s Hair and Sacrificing on His Behalf

Sacrificing upon shaving a new-born’s hair is [H: emphatically] recommended like the sacrifice of Hajj. Its timing is from birth until attaining puberty. Thereafter, one may perform it for one’s self.

It is best performed on the seventh day [H: from birth, including the birth day]. If one does not slaughter on it, then [A: sacrifice] on the fourteenth day. If not, then the twenty-first day.

The most complete [A: sacrifice] is two shāhs [A: yearling sheep or two-year-old goats] for a male. One should not break it’s [A: i.e. the sacrificial animal] bones [H: where possible], and should give it away in charity cooked, with sweets. Sending it [H: to the paupers instead of calling them to it] is more complete.

It is recommended to shave the new-born’s head after the slaughtering; and to give in charity it’s weight [H: i.e. the hair of the head] in gold, then in silver; and to rub the infant’s gums with dates or something sweet. It is detested to wipe blood on his [H: i.e. the new-born] head, but there is nothing wrong with saffron.

On Prohibitions Relating to Hair and Similar Matters

It is prohibited to:

1. dye one’s grey hairs black;
2. put extensions into one’s hair;
3. make gaps between one’s teeth;
4. get a tattoo;
5. and for a man to have henna without need.

 

Ma’alim al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah

Recently, I’ve been reading the three volume Ma’alim al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah (Damascus: Dar al-Qalam, 2015) by Salih al-Shami, whom I have mentioned elsewhere. It is proving to be a very useful reference and I am seriously considering teaching from it in future. I would like to bring more attention to this work, beginning with this post.

For those familiar with shaykh Salih, it is the fruit of his life’s work in compiling various zawa’id works which collect hadiths of certain books not available in certain other books. I have previously praised his al-Wafi, which complies all the hadiths of al-Bukhari and Muslim whilst removing the repetitions. Among his other zawa’id books are:

• al-Jami’ bayn al-Sahihayn (compiling the contents of al-Bukhari and Muslim, currently being taught publicly in our city)
• Zawa’id al-Sunan ‘ala al-Sahihayn (the hadiths of Abu Dawud, a-Tirmidhi, al-Nasa’i, and Ibn Majah not available in al-Bukhari and Muslim)
• Zawa’id al-Muwatta wa al-Musnad (compiling hadiths from Malik and Ahmad not available in the six collections mentioned above)
• Zawa’id al-Sunan al-Kubra (compiling the hadiths of al-Bayhaqi’s magnificent masterpiece that are unavailable in the above eight collections)
• Zawa’id Ibn Khuzaymah, Ibn Hibban, and al-Mustadrak (compiling the hadiths in these collections not available in the nine collections mentioned above)
• Zawa’id al-Ahadith al-Mukhtara (compiling the hadiths of al-Maqdisi unavailable in the above twelve collections)

So these six compilations (totalling twenty-two volumes) gather the hadith texts of fourteen of the major collections of hadith. You really would struggle to find a hadith not contained therein. Shaykh Salih has now summarised the above fourteen collections and his own six compilations (with some modifications of his own) into a single three-volume reference, the subject of this post.

Shaykh Salih himself counts the totally of the hadiths (including repetitions) in the fourteen major compilations to be 114,194 in number! He removed the repetitions in his six compilations to bring the number of individual hadiths down to 28,430. These in turn have now been refined and summarised down to 3,921 hadiths in his latest compilation, focusing on the sahih and hasan (in his view) from the above. He mentions that he only includes weak hadiths if they clarify the meaning of a sahih or hasan hadith or if they pertain to virtues and good deeds. He says these amount to no more than 33, and none of them are very weak. He relies on the following editions for his compilation, as well as their editors’ hadith verifications:

• Al-Albani for the four sunan
• Husayn Salim Asad al-Darani for al-Darimi
• Shu’ayb al-Arna’ut for Musnad Ahmad and Ibn Hibban
• Abd al-Qadir al-Arna’ut for al-Muwatta (from Jami’ al-Usul)
• Muhammad Mustafa al-A’zami for Ibn Khuzaymah
• al-Dhahbi for al-Mustadrak (incomplete approach)
• al-Bayhaqi for himself (incomplete approach)
• ‘Abd al-Malik for al-Maqdisi

My criticism with this is that each editor has his own methodology and this approach can and does lead to inconsistencies. Not only that, few of these editions are truly critical editions and some hadiths are missing from them. If only he had better reference material and the ability to grade himself! Nevertheless, shaykh Salih is to be commended for such a wonderful effort and knowing his own limitations. His arrangement of the hadiths into various chapters is good and you can usually find a certain familiar hadith where you might expect to find it, with some exceptions. This leads to my main criticism – there is no index! I hope future editions include indices of atraf, narrators, etc. otherwise I fear I might have to compile them myself!

Overall, I am thoroughly enjoying the book and can envisage great possibilities using it in my teaching, with a focus on understanding the content of the hadith, leaving chains and methodology for later levels. I could easily see this in a curriculum before students commence with al-Sahihayn, and Sunan, and the other reference works. I’m still engaging with this work, but do encourage others to acquire copies for their own use too.